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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to control damage from debris in the
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows.
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and photographic
analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant
data in verifying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addition to the
Kennedy Space Center Photo/Video Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center and Marshall
Space Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the
mission.
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Photo 1: Launch of Shuttle Mission STS-86
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1.0 SUMMARY
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on
24 September 1997. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-2 also included the primary
flight elements OV-104 Atlantis (20th flight), ET-88 (LWT 81), and BI-090 SRB's. There were
no significant vehicle or launch pad anomalies.
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 25 September 1997 from 1815
to 1940 hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No Ice, Debris, or
TPS IPR's were taken. Due to the warm weather conditions, there were no acreage icing
concerns. There were also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
The Final Inspection Team closely inspected the composite nose cone and perforated GOX vent
seals due to the new configuration changes. The first observations at the beginning of the
inspection revealed a considerable amount of dripping/running moisture in the nose cone area
attributed to the recent rainfall. No ice was detected in this area and surface temperatures as
measured by the portable STI averaged 61 degrees Fahrenheit. Vapors were visible exiting the -Z
side of the southwest GOX vent seal. However, these vapors were relatively warm as imaged by
the portable STI and were attributed to the heated nitrogen purge exiting some exposed seal
perforations. A second inspection approximately an hour later revealed dry TPS with no ice or
frost. The previously-observed moisture had probably been removed by the heated nitrogen purge
in the GOX vent hood.
At T-2 minutes 30 seconds, the GOX vent seals were deflated. As soon as the hood was raised
and the seals retracted, more-than-expected frost was visible on the ET louvers. A 2-inch wide
band of frost was also present around the louvers on the composite nose cone. However, no ice
was detected and frost is not a constraint for launch. But the presence of the frost raised concerns
that moisture, most likely from the rain out of the west (260 degrees driven by 33 knot winds),
had been somehow entrapped inside the seal.
After the 10:34 p.m. (local) launch on 25 September 1997, a debris walk down of Pad 39A was
performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. All the T-0 umbilicals operated
properly. Overall, damage to the launch pad was minimal.
A total of 109 films and videos were analyzed as part of the post mission data review. No vehicle
damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission.
A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #3. The stud "twanged" briefly after clearing the aft skirt before
dropping into the holddown post. The stud abraded metal from the aft skirt bore and the resulting
semi-circular piece was observed falling past the HDP shoe. No stud hang-ups were observed on
the other seven holddown posts. No ordnance debris or frangible nut pieces fell from the
DCS/stud holes. New configuration of SRB aft skirt thermal curtains without thermal curtain tape
exhibited no anomalies during lifioff.
A light-colored object first appeared from an area behind the left SRB exhaust plume somewhat
near the GH2 dispersal system (stovepipe) at 02:34:20.516 UTC. A second object appeared in the
same general vicinity at 02:34:20.850 UTC above the stovepipe. Both objects were irregularly
shaped, moved generally in a +Y direction away from the vehicle, and did not have vapor or
smoke trails.
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A third light-coloredobjectfirst appearedfrom anareanearthe left SRBexhaustplumegenerally
abovetheLH2 TSM at 02:34:21.264UTC andmovedin a -Y directionawayfrom the vehicle.
Theobjectwassemi-rigidwith dimensionsestimatedto be30-incheslong by 4-incheswide by an
inch thick. The object exhibiteda curved shapewhen viewed in plan form. Reversingthe
trajectory revealedthe objectpassingthe aft skirt thermalcurtainson the north sideof the SRB
andpossiblyoriginatinggenerallyfrom theHDP #7area.
A more detailed debris inspection was conducted at the pad. Four pieces of white RTV, the
largest of which was curved in shape and measured 18.5-inches long by 2.25-inches wide by
1.5-inches thick, were found west of the MLP. Examination of holddown post #7 revealed
approximately 40 linear inches of protective white RTV was missing along the base
circumference.
OV-104 was equipped with umbilical cameras. There were no anomalies during separation of the
SRB's from the External Tank. However, ET separation from the Orbiter was not visible due to
the dark conditions of a night launch.
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after retrieval. Both frustums were in
excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds/unbonds were detected over fasteners.
All eight BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position though the attach
ring on the left frustum upper left position had been bent by parachute riser entanglement. Seven
of the holddown post Debris Containment Systems (DCS) plungers were seated and appeared to
have functioned normally. The HDP #3 stud bore was broached. Stud thread impressions were
visible in the bore. Post launch film analysis confirmed the stud hang-up occurred on HDP #3.
Orbiter performance as viewed on landing films and videos during final approach, touchdown, and
rollout was nominal. Drag chute operation was also normal.
A post landing inspection of OV-104 Atlantis was conducted after the 5:55 p.m. touchdown on
6 October 1997 at the Kennedy Space Center on SLF runway 15. The Orbiter TPS sustained a
total of 129 hits, of which 31 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger. A comparison of these
numbers to statistics from 71 previous missions of similar configuration indicates the total number
of hits was greater than average and the number of hits 1-inch or larger was significantly greater
than average.
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 100 hits, of which 27 had a major dimension of
1-inch or larger. The largest lower surface tile damage site was located on the left glove and
measured 6.5-inches long by 1.25-inches wide by 0.25-inches maximum depth. This damage site
was just one of 26 hits (with 13 larger than 1-inch) from an area to the left of the nose progressing
aft almost to the left main landing gear door - an unusual occurrence. In order to investigate the
cause of this damage, the ET/ORB umbilical films were reviewed, samples were taken from five
tile damage sites for chemical analysis, and the data base for debris particles in an aerodynamic
flow were utilized for trajectory analysis.
The trajectory analysis considered a variety of debris particle sizes, densities, and Mach numbers.
The results indicated the tile damaging debris most likely originated from an area equivalent to the
ET intertank, LO2 tank barrel section, or left SRB nose cap (the left SRB frustum was missing no
material when inspected after flight). The Orbiter umbilical films yielded no information due to the
dark conditions of a night launch. The tile damage sites were scoured clean by re-entry and
samples taken for chemical analysis yielded no definitive traces. Therefore, the cause of the
unusual tile damage is unexplained, though it should be noted the new ET composite nose cone is
located too far forward on the vehicle to be considered a probable source.
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2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Debris/Ice/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for launch activities was conducted
on 24 September 1997 at 1500 hours. The following personnel participated in various team
activities, assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained in
this document.
J. Tatum NASA - KSC
G. Katnik NASA - KSC
J. Lin NASA - KSC
R. Speece NASA - KSC
B. Bowen NASA - KSC
J. Rivera NASA - KSC
B. Davis NASA - KSC
R. Page NASA - KSC
M. Valdivia USA- SPC
J. Blue USA- SPC
R. Seale USA- SPC
W. Richards USA- SPC
M. Wollam USA- SPC
G. Fales USA- SPC
F. Foster BNA- LSS
C. Hill BNA - LSS
J. Cook THIO -LSS
S. Otto LMSO- LSS
J. Ramirez LMSO - LSS
D. Maxwell USA- Safety
Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
Thermal Protection Systems
Infrared Scanning Systems
ET Mechanisms/Structures
Digital Imaging Systems
SSP Integration
Supervisor, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
Systems Integration
Systems Integration.
SRM Processing
ET Processing
ET Processing
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3.0 LAUNCH
STS-86 was launched at 97:269:02:34:19.000 UTC (10:34 p.m. local) on 25 September 1997.
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on
24 September 1997. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39A and MLP-2 also included the primary
flight elements OV-104 Atlantis (20th flight), ET-88 (LWT 81), and BI-090 SRB's. There were
no significant vehicle or launch pad anomalies.
3.2 FINAL INSPECTION
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 25 September 1997 from 1815
to 1940 hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No Ice, Debris, or
TPS IPR's were taken. Due to the warm weather conditions, there were no acreage icing
concerns. There were also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to obtain
vehicle surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed scanners, and to scan for unusual
temperature gradients.
3.2.1 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS thruster covers were intact
though three of the covers on thrusters F3F, R1R, and L4L were tinted green indicating slight
internal vapor leaks. Ice/frost and condensate had formed on SSME #1 and #2 heat shield-to-
nozzle interfaces. The SSME #3 heat shield was dry. An infrared scan revealed no unusual
temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields.
3.2.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the STI radiometers were close to ambient temperatures. All
measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. The predicted
Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature supplied by THIO was 80 degrees F, which was within the
required range of 44-86 degrees F.
3.2.3 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run as a comparison to infrared
scanner point measurements. The program predicted condensate, but no ice or frost, on the ET
acreage TPS.
The Final Inspection Team observed light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the
LO2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures averaged 71 degrees F. The composite nose cone
and perforated GOX vent seals were closely inspected due to the new configuration changes. The
first observations at the beginning of the inspection revealed a considerable amount of dripping/
running moisture in the nose cone area attributed to the recent rainfall. No ice was detected in this
area and surface temperatures as measured by the portable STI averaged 61 degrees Fahrenheit.
Vapors were visible exiting the -Z side of the southwest GOX vent seal. However, these vapors
were relatively warm as imaged by the portable STI and were attributed to the heated nitrogen
purge exiting some exposed seal perforations. A second inspection approximately an hour later
revealed dry TPS with no ice or frost. The previously-observed moisture had probably been
removed by the heated nitrogen purge in the GOX vent hood.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Ice/frost accumulation on the GUCP appeared
typical.
The Final Inspection Team observed light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the
LI-I2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures averaged 68 degrees F on the +Z side and 58
degrees F on the -Z side. The 10 degree difference between the two sides was expected and
attributed to the new "thick/thin" TPS configuration. All TPS repairs on the +Z side of the LH2
tank were intact with no visible frost lines.
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows and support brackets.
No visible stress relief crack had formed on the -Y vertical strut forward facing TPS.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost accumulations were
limited to small patches on the aft and inboard sides. Ice/frost fingers on the separation bolt
pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical.
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. The LH2
feedline bellows were wet with condensate.
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier
outboard side and forward surface. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro canister and
plate gap purge vents. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable
replenish, and launch.
3.2.4 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch.
No leaks were observed on the GUCP or the LO2 and LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals.
3.3 TERMINAL COUNT
By T-2 minutes 30 seconds, the GOX vent seals were deflated. As soon as the hood was raised
and the seals retracted, more-than-expected frost was visible on the ET louvers. A 2-inch wide
band of frost was also present around the louvers on the composite nose cone. This condition was
documented on Anomaly 003 in OMI $6444. However, no ice was detected and frost is not a
constraint for launch. But the presence of the frost raised concerns that moisture, most likely from
the rain out of the west (260 degrees driven by 33 knot winds), had been somehow entrapped
inside the seal. A plan to install lights and cameras for the purpose of observing the louvers during
cryoload is being worked.

Photo 2:STS-86 Ready for Launch
OV-104 Atlantis (20th flight), ET-88 (LWT 81), and BI-090 SRB's. The Final Inspection Team
observed light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the LO2 tank acreage. TPS
surface temperatures averaged 71 degrees F.
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Photo 3:LH2 Tank After Cryoload
The Final Inspection Team observed light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the
LH2 tank acreage. Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical
purge barrier outboard side and forward surface. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the
pyro canister and plate gap purge vents•
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Photo 4: Overall View of SSME's
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Photo 5: Frost on Composite Nose Cone
By T-2 minutes 30 seconds, the GOX vent seals were deflated. As soon as the hood was raised
and the seals retracted, more-than-expected frost was visible on the ET louvers. A 2-inch wide
band &frost was also present around the louvers on the composite nose cone. This condition was
documented on Anomaly 003 in OMI $6444. However, no ice was detected and frost is not a
constraint for launch.
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of MLP 2, Pad A FSS and RSS was conducted on 25 September 1997
from Launch + 2 to 3.5 hours.
SRB hold down post erosion generally was typical. Boeing - Downey reported an Orbiter lifioff
lateral acceleration of 0.3 g's, which is above the 0.14 g threshold when stud hang-ups occur.
Preliminary observations of the south holddown posts from the MLP deck revealed no obvious
signs of a stud hang-up. Launch films confirmed the stud hang-up occurred on HDP #3. North
holddown posts, at_ skirt purge lines, and T-0 umbilicals exhibited typical exhaust plume damage.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM) and Orbiter Access Arm (OAA) showed no obvious damage. The
TSM bonnets were closed.
The GH2 vent line was latched in the sixth of eight teeth of the latching mechanism. No damage
was apparent on the GUCP 7-inch QD from the static retract lanyard. All evidence indicated a
nominal retraction and latchback.
GOX vent seals were in excellent shape with no indications of plume damage.
These inspections noted minimal overall damage to the pad.
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5.0 FILM REVIEW
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the Mission Management Team,
Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems engineers. No IPR's or IFA's were generated as a result of
the film review.
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 83 films and videos, which included twenty-seven 16ram films, seventeen 35ram films,
and thirty-nine videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
Due to the dark conditions of a night launch, atmospheric haze, and overexposure (white-out) of
some films, vehicle detail was sometimes difficult to discern.
SSME ignition appeared normal. Noticeable amounts of free burning hydrogen drifted up to the
OMS pods and under the body flap during start-up before being drawn into the plume by
aspiration. The Math diamonds formed in the expected sequence (E-76; OTV-051, 070, TV-7).
Three debris-induced streaks occurred in the SSME #1 exhaust plume during start-up (E-2, -3, -5,
-19, -20).
SSME ignition caused pieces of ice to fall from the ET/ORB umbilicals. Several pieces of ice
contacted the umbilical cavity sills and were deflected outward. No tile damage was visible.
Condensate and small pieces of ice falling from the LH2 feedline bellows contacted the LH2
recirculation line, but no damage to TPS was visible (OTV-009).
Tile surface coating material was lost during ignition from two places on the at_ surface of the LH
OMS pod and one place on the aft surface of the LH RCS stinger (E-20). Three light spots on the
base heat shield outboard of SSME #3 may be areas of missing tile surface coating material (OTV
070).
No structural or icing anomalies were detected on the new External Tank composite nose cone.
Frost covered several fastener heads, a 2-3 inch wide band around each louver, and several louver
vanes. Some residual GOX vapors exited the louvers, but no ice was present (OTV 013, 060,
061,062).
A white particle originating from the Orbiter LH2 8-inch line T-0 interface at lifioff is believed to
be a piece of ice (OTV 050).
A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #3. The stud "twanged" briefly after clearing the aft skirt before
dropping into the holddown post. The stud abraded metal from the aft skirt bore and the resulting
semi-circular piece was observed falling past the HDP shoe (E-10). No stud hang-ups were
observed on the other seven holddown posts. No ordnance debris or frangible nut pieces fell from
the DCS/stud holes. The north HDP blast covers closed normally.
New configuration of SRB a__ skirt thermal curtains without thermal curtain tape exhibited no
anomalies during liRoff (OTV 049, 050).
A white particle originated from the upper LH2 TSM area (02:34:16.542 UTC) and moved
toward the vehicle before falling at_ along side SSME #3 (E-18).
A debris object, believed to be a piece of SRB throat plug material, was ejected upward out of the
LH SRB exhaust hole in the vicinity of HDP #8 at 02:34:20.336 UTC (E-16).
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A hght-coloredobjectfirst appearedfrom anareabehindthe left SRBexhaustplumesomewhat
neartheGH2 dispersalsystem(stovepipe)at 02:34:20.516UTC. A secondobjectappearedin the
samegeneralvicinity at 02:34:20.850UTC abovethe stovepipe.Both objectswere irregularly
shaped,movedgenerallyin a +Y directionawayfrom the vehicle,and did not havevapor or
smoketrails (E-76).
A third light-coloredobject first appearedfrom an area behind the left SRB exhaust plume
generally above the LH2 TSM (in this field of view) at 02:34:21.264 UTC and moved in a -Y
direction away from the vehicle. The object was semi-rigid with dimensions estimated to be
30-inches long by 4-inches wide by an inch thick. The object exhibited a curved shape when
viewed in plan form. The object did not exhibit a dark side, which might be a candidate for SRB
throat plug RTV, while tumbling (E-76, -222).
However, the white objects described above are also visible in film item E-4 from a camera in the
northwest comer of the MLP deck. A white object moving upward and then arcing eastward at
02:34:20.642 UTC followed by a second object ejected vertically at 02:34:20.760 UTC appeared
to originate from the HDP #7 area. Shortly afterwards, a curved object first appeared near the LH
SRB aft skirt at 02:34:21.230 UTC moving westward. Reversing the trajectory revealed the
object passing the aft skirt thermal curtains on the north side of the SRB and possibly originating
generally from the I-IDP #7 area. (Note: data from film item E-1 in the northeast comer of the
MLP deck would have been instrumental in the identification and trajectory analysis of these
objects had not the camera failed due to an internal film jam). A fourth white debris object falling
vertically from the FSS/RSS area at 02:34:21.464 UTC was unrelated to these objects. None of
these objects was observed contacting the flight hardware.
A more detailed debris inspection was conducted at the pad. Four pieces of white RTV, the
largest of which was curved in shape and measured 18.5-inches long by 2.25-inches wide by
1.5-inches thick, were found west of the MLP. Examination of holddown post #7 revealed
approximately 40 linear inches of protective white RTV was missing along the base
circumference.
Film items E-60 and E-62 provided additional views of the white debris objects near the left SRB
aft skirt shortly after liftoff.
Five large pieces of the ET/ORB umbilical purge barriers fell aft during the roll maneuver. This is
an expected occurrence (E-207, -212, -213, -222).
Debris-induced streaks appeared in the SSME exhaust plume nine times during ascent (E-213,
-222, -223, -224).
Movement of the body flap in flight was very pronounced. Twisting of the body flap appeared
visually to be somewhat more than usual compared to previous recent flights (E-207, -212, -213,
-223).
SRB separation appeared normal. Numerous pieces of slag fell from the exhaust plume just
before, during, and after separation (E-207, -208; TV-13).
13
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Photo 6: HDP #3 Stud Hang-Up
Enhanced digital view of a stud hang-up on HDP #3. The stud "twanged" briefly
after clearing the aft skirt before dropping into the holddown post.
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Photo 7: HDP #7 White RTV Debris
Enhanced digital view of a light-colored object first appearing from an area behind the left SRB
exhaust plume generally above the LH2 TSM at 02:34:21264 UTC and moving in a -Y direction
away from the vehicle. The object was semi-rigid with dimensions estimated to be 30-inches long
by 4-inches wide by 1- inch thick. The object exhibited a curved shape while tumbling.
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YPhoto 8: HDP #7 White RTV Debris
Enhanced digital view shows piece of RTV moving away from the vehicle. The day after launch, a
more detailed debris inspection was conducted at the pad. Four pieces of white RTV, the largest
of which was curved in shape and measured 18.5-inches long by 2.25-inches wide by 1.5-inches
thick, were found west of the MLP. Examination ofholddown post #7 revealed approximately 40
linear inches of protective white RTV was missing along the base circumference.
16
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
OV-104 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: 16mm motion picture with 5 mm lens; 16mm
motion picture with 10mm lens; 35mm still views. The 35mm images from the LO2 umbilical
were dark. Hand-held photography by the flight crew, which consisted of thirty-seven still 35mm
images and a 20 second video, showed the ET too distant and small in size for detail.
SRB separation from the External Tank appeared nominal.
Very thin, charred layers of TPS were observed falling away from the aft surface of the -Y upper
strut fairing closeout just before SRB separation. This is a normal occurrence. Charring and
erosion of TPS from the LI-L2 ET/ORB umbilical cable tray and -Y vertical strut was also typical.
ET-88 separation from the Orbiter was not visible due to the dark conditions of a night launch.
5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 24 films and videos, which included nine 35mm large format films, one 16mm film, and
twelve videos, were reviewed.
The landing gear extended properly. The infrared scanners showed no debris falling from the
Orbiter during final approach. The main landing gear contacted the runway almost simultaneously
straddling the centerline. Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. The Orbiter rolled
west of the centerline before being steered back onto the centerline.
Drag chute operation appeared nominal though deployment was delayed until after nose gear
touchdown to counteract the effects of the cross wind. Both reefing cords could be seen falling
from the drag chute to the runway. Rollout and wheel stop were uneventful.
TPS damage on the lower surface of both right and left glove area was visible in the films.
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Photo 9: SRB Separation from External Tank
SRB separation from the External Tank appeared nominal. Very thin, charred layers of TPS fell
away from the aft surface of the -Y upper strut fairing closeout just before SRB separation. This
is a normal occurrence. Charring and erosion of TPS from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical cable tray
and -Y vertical strut was also typical.
18

6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
The BI-090 Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at CCAS
Hangar AF on 29 September 1997.
Both frustums were in excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds/unbonds were
detected over fasteners. Virtually none of the Hypalon paint had blistered. All eight BSM aero
heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position though the attach ring on the left
frustum upper left position had been bent by parachute riser entanglement.
The forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. RSS antennae covers/phenolic base
plates were intact. The +Z antenna base plates on both SRB's exhibited two delaminated phenolic
layers. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA closeouts had been applied.
All frustum severance ring pins and retainer clips were intact.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were generally in good condition. Trailing
edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The stiffener rings, ETA rings, and IEA's
appeared undamaged by water impact though the right upper strut fairing -Z side was dented.
Instafoam aft of the SRB stiffener tings had shrunk causing separation from the trailing edge of
the stiffener rings as well as fissures in the foam. This is the second flight exhibiting this
phenomenon.
TPS on the external surface of both aft skirts was intact and in good condition. A 2-inch long by
1-inch wide piece of red tape was discovered between the cluster and single aft BSM on the RH
SRB. The tape had been covered by Hypalon during the a_ff skirt buildup process.
Most of the instafoam between HDP #1 to HDP #4 on the right SRB and between HDP #6 to
HDP #8 on the left SRB was missing.
Seven of the holddown post Debris Containment Systems (DCS) plungers were seated and
appeared to have functioned normally. The I-IDP #1 DCS plunger was not fully seated and
appeared to be partially offset by frangible nut debris. The HDP #3 stud bore was broached. Stud
thread impressions were visible in the bore. Post launch film analysis confirmed the stud hang-up
occurred on I-IDP #3.
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Photo 10: Frustum Post Flight Condition
Both frustums were in excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds/unbonds were
detected over fasteners. Virtually none of the Hypalon paint had blistered. All eight BSM aero
heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position though the attach ring on the lei_
frustum upper left position had been bent by parachute riser entanglement.
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Photo 11: Forward Skirt Post Flight Condition
The forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. RSS antennae covers/phenolic base
plates were intact. The +Z antenna base plates on both SRB's exhibited two delaminated phenolic
layers. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA closeouts had been applied.
All frustum severance ring pins and retainer clips were intact.
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Photo 12: Aft Booster/Aft Skirt Post Flight Condition
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The stiffener rings, ETA rings, and IEA's
appeared undamaged by water impact though the right upper strut fairing -Z side was dented.
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Photo 13: Stiffener Ring Foam Shrinkage
Instafoam af_ of the SP, B stiffener tings had shrunk causing separation from the trailing edge of
the stiffener tings as well as fissures in the foam. This is the second flight exhibiting this
phenomenon.
23

7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing inspection of OV-104 Atlantis was conducted after the 5:55 p.m. touchdown on
6 October 1997 at the Kennedy Space Center on SLF runway 15 and in the Orbiter Processing
Facility bay #3. This inspection was performed to identify debris impact damage and, if possible,
debris sources.
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 129 hits, of which 31 had a major dimension of 1-inch or
larger. This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME
vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics
from 71 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R,
27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known debris sources), indicates the total number of
hits was greater than average and the number of hits 1-inch or larger was significantly greater than
average (Reference Figures 1-3. Note: no hits were recorded on the right side of the Orbiter, so
the corresponding figure was omitted).
The following table breaks down the STS-86 Orbiter debris damage by area:
I-_TS > 1" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface 27 100
Upper surface 2 21
Right side 0 0
Left side 0 3
Right OMS Pod 0 2
Left OMS Pod 2 3
TOTALS 31 129
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 100 hits, of which 27 had a major dimension of
1-inch or larger. The largest lower surface tile damage site was located on the left glove and
measured 6.5-inches long by 1.25-inches wide by 0.25-inches maximum depth. This damage site
was just one of 26 hits (with 13 larger than 1-inch) from an area to the left of the nose progressing
a_ff almost to the left main landing gear door - an unusual occurrence. In order to investigate the
cause of this damage, the ET/ORB umbilical films were reviewed, samples were taken from five
tile damage sites for chemical analysis, and the data base for debris particles in an aerodynamic
flow were utilized for trajectory analysis.
The trajectory analysis considered a variety of debris particle sizes, densities, and Mach numbers.
The results indicated the tile damaging debris most likely originated from an area equivalent to the
ET intertank, LO2 tank barrel section, or left SRB nose cap (the left SRB frustum was missing no
material when inspected after flight). The Orbiter umbilical films yielded no information due to the
dark conditions of a night launch. The tile damage sites were scoured clean by re-entry and
samples taken for chemical analysis yielded no definitive traces. Therefore, the cause of the
unusual tile damage is unexplained, though it should be noted the new ET composite nose cone is
located too far forward on the vehicle to be considered a probable source.
Tile damage sites around and aft of the LH2 and LO2 ET/ORB umbilicals were somewhat greater
than usual in size and quantity. The damage was most likely caused by impacts from umbilical ice
or shredded pieces of umbilical purge barrier material flapping in the airstream.
One lower surface damage site (tile V070-391034-648) may have been caused by a
micrometeorite or on-orbit debris impact. The 1-inch diameter damage site featured a 0.25-inch
diameter by 0.25 inch deep cavity perpendicular to the tile outer mold line.
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Thetires,which exhibitedno ply undercutting, were reported to be in good condition for a cross
wind landing on the KSC concrete runway.
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-1, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned normally. No ordnance
fragments were found on the runway beneath the umbilical cavities. The EO-2 and EO-3 retainer
springs appeared to be in nominal configuration. Two clips were missing from the EO-2 fitting
"salad bowl". Virtually no umbilical closeout foam or white RTV dam material adhered to the
umbilical plate near the LH2 recirculation line disconnect.
The SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were generally in good
condition. However, a blanket panel on SSME #1 at the 5-6 o'clock position was torn/frayed.
The thermal insulators on both FES vents were undamaged.
Although the drag chute was deployed aiter the nose wheel was on the runway, vertical stabilizer
"stinger" tiles sustained no damage from the reefing lines.
No ice adhered to the payload bay door. No unusual tile damage occurred on the leading edges of
the OMS pods or vertical stabilizer.
Hazing and streaking of forward-facing Orbiter windows was typical. Damage sites on the
window perimeter tiles was noticeably less than usual in quantity and size, though a piece of a
forward RCS thruster paper cover was wedged between window #5 and the perimeter tiles.
The post landing walkdown of Runway 15 was performed immediately after landing. No debris
concerns were identified. All drag chute hardware was recovered and appeared to have functioned
normally. The pyrotechnic devices on the reefing line cutters had been expended.
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was greater than average when compared
to previous missions. The number of hits 1-inch or larger was significantly greater than average
(reference Figure 4).
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Photo 14: Overall View Orbiter Right Side
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Photo 15: Overall View Orbiter Left Side
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Photo16: Lower SurfaceTile Damage
TheOrbiter lower surface sustained a total of 100 hits,
of which 27 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger.
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Photo 17: Lower Surface Tile Damage
The largest lower surface tile damage site was located on the left glove and measured 6.5-inches
long by 1.25-inches wide by 0.25-inches maximum depth.
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Photo 18: Lower Surface Tile Damage
This damage sites are just some of 26 hits (with 13 larger than 1-inch) from an area to the left of
the nose progressing aft almost to the left main landing gear door - an unusual occurrence.
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Photo 19:LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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Photo 20: LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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Photo 21: Windows and Perimeter Tiles
Hazing and streaking of forward-facing Orbiter windows was typical. Damage sites on the
window perimeter tiles was noticeably less than usual in quantity and size, though a piece of a
forward RCS thruster paper cover was wedged between window #5 and the perimeter tiles.
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1.0 STS-86 (OV-104): Film/Video Screening and Timing Summary
STS-86 (OV-104): FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING SUMMARY
SCREENING ACTIVITIES
1.1.1 Launch
The STS-86 launch of Atlantis (OV-104) from pad A occurred on Thursday,
September 25, 1997 (day 269) at 02:34:19.011 Coordinated Universal Time
(UTC) as seen on camera E9. Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) separation occurred
at 02:36:22.025 UTC as seen on camera E207.
On launch day, 24 of the 24 expected videos were received and screened.
Following launch day, 19 films were screened. Twenty-two additional films
were received for contingency support and anomaly resolution, but were not
screened since there were no major launch/ascent issues. No anomalies that
could threaten vehicle safety were seen on the launch imagery.
Photography of the left SRB and the LSRB/ET aft attach and ET aft dome was
acquired using umbilical well camera film (Method 1). Handheld still
photography of the ET was acquired (Method 4). A handheld video of the
external tank following separation was also acquired.
1.1.2 On-Orbit
No unplanned on-orbit analysis support was requested. Analysis support was
provided to the Mir station photographic and television external survey (Detailed
Test Objective 1118).
1.1.3 Landing
Atlantis made a late afternoon landing on runway 15 at the KSC Shuttle Landing
Facility on October 6, 1997. Twelve videos were received and screened.
Following landing, ten films were screened.
Although not considered anomalous, APU venting was seen during the approach
through roll-out and wheel stop. Flames were seen coming from the APU vent
after wheel stop until APU shutdown.
The drag chute deployment was delayed until after nose wheel touchdown
because of crosswinds. The drag chute deployment appeared normal.
1.1.4 Post Landing
The following items were seen on the post landing walk-around inspection video:
a thin, jagged streak or line on the mid-section of the right side of the rudder,
three possibly damaged tiles beneath the forward edge of the left wing, a partially
torn close-out blanket panel at the six o'clock position of the SSME #1 Dome
Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS), a small area of tile damage near the left aft RCS
thrusters, slight discolorations on the leading edge of the right OMS pod, normal
tile erosion of the base heat shield and body flap, an area of brown discoloration
in the LO2 umbilical, a small amount of white material (possibly RTV) in the
LO2 umbilical well, and a red/brown-colored streak on the nose gear strut
(possibly hydraulic fluid). The tires appeared to be in good condition. Tile
damage around the Orbiter windows appeared to be less than normal.
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TIMING ACTIVITIES
The time codes from videos and films were used to identify specific events
during the screening process.
The landing and drag chute event times are provided in Table 1.2.
Event Description Time (UTC) Camera
Landing Gear Doors Opened
Right Main Wheel Touchdown
Left Main Wheel Touchdown
Nose Gear Touchdown
Drag Chute Initiation
Pilot Chute at Full Inflation
Bag Release
Drag Chute Inflation in
Reefed Configuration
Drag Chute Inflation in
Disreefed Configuration
Drag Chute Release
Wheel Stop
279:21:54:48.735
279:21:55:08.547
279:21:55:08:567
279:21:55:18.560
279:21:55:22.048
279:21:55:23.077
279:21:55:24.445
279:21:55:26.414
279:21:55:29.218
279:21:55:56.647
279:21:56:29.945
EL30
EL7
EL7
EL4
EL 17 IR
KTV 15L
KTV15L
KTV 15L
KTV11L
EL2
KTV11L
Table 1.2 Landing Events Timing
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2.1
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
DEBRIS FROM SSME IGNITION TO LIFTOFF
As on previous missions, multiple pieces of debris were seen near the time of
SSME ignition until liftoff (umbilical ice debris, RCS paper, SRB flame duct and
water baffle debris). No damage to the vehicle was noted. No follow-up action
was requested.
Figure 2.1 (A) Umbilical Ice Striking LH2 Umbilical Door Sill
A single piece of umbilical ice debris was seen to strike the ET/Orbiter LH2
umbilical door sill during SSME ignition at 02:34:15.585 UTC. Another piece of
umbilical ice was seen to strike the LH2 four-inch recirculation line at
02:34:16.419 UTC (Camera OTV009). No damage to the door sill or the four-
inch recirculation line was visible.
A dark-colored piece of debris was seen near the RSRB aft skirt during SSME
ignition (02:34:15.704 UTC) (Camera E2).
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Figure 2.1 (B) Probable Ice Debris near Vertical Stabilizer
A single piece of white-colored debris (probably ice) was seen near the trailing
edge of the vertical stabilizer during SSME ignition at 02:34:15.686 UTC. This
debris may have been ice from the LH2 TSM T-O umbilical disconnect area
(Cameras OTV050, OTV070).
A single piece of dark-colored debris, first seen near the RSRB aft skirt, was seen
to arc upward before falling aft along the body flap at liftoff (02:34:19.3 through
02:34:20.4 UTC) (Cameras E2, E5). The debris was not seen to contact the
vehicle.
A dark piece of debris of unknown origin was seen near the LSRB aft skirt
traveling upward toward the ET/Orbiter umbilicals during liftoff. The debris was
not seen to contact the vehicle (02:34:19:431 UTC) (Camera E31 ).
i
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2.2
Figure 2.1 (C) Debris near LSRB Aft Skirt
On camera film E76, a long, curved, light-colored piece of debris was seen near
the LSRB aft skirt traveling in an upward direction toward the FSS during liftoff
(02:34:21:426 UTC). Three pieces of debris, first seen over the gaseous
hydrogen dispersal system (stovepipe), traveled upward on the right side of the
LSRB (02:34:20.536 and 02:34:20.991 UTC). None of the debris were seen to
contact the launch vehicle.
Several pieces of white-colored debris (probably umbilical ice) were noted
falling aft of the Orbiter body flap at liftoff (02:34:20.557 UTC) (Camera
OTV049).
Multiple pieces of light-colored debris were seen north of the MLP during liftoff
(02:34:20.614 UTC) (Camera KTV7A). The debris appeared to move away
from the vehicle.
DEBRIS DURING ASCENT
Multiple pieces of debris (probably umbilical ice) fell aft of the launch vehicle
after liftoff through the roll maneuver. None of the debris was seen to contact
the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested. (Cameras E207, E212, E222,
E223, E224).
Debris, first seen near the LSRB forward of the aft skirt, was seen falling aft of
the vehicle during ascent at 02:34:35.128 UTC (Camera E223).
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Debris, first seen near the LSRB forward of the aft skirt, was seen falling aft of
the vehicle during ascent at 02:34:35. 128 UTC (Camera E223).
Multiple pieces of light-colored debris (possibly forward RCS paper) were seen
failing aft of the vertical stabilizer after the roll maneuver between 02:34:36.9
and 02:34:39.6 UTC (Cameras E222, E223, E224, ET212).
A single piece of debris was seen in the SSME exhaust plume after the roll
maneuver at 02:34:41.75 UTC. A single piece of light-colored debris (possibly
umbilical purge barrier material) was seen just aft of the body flap at
02:34:52.4 UTC (Camera ET207).
Light-colored debris (probably ET/Orbiter umbilical purge barrier material) were
seen falling aft of the launch vehicle during early ascent (02:34:52.453 UTC)
(Camera E223).
2.3
Figure 2.2 (A) Debris before SRB Separation
Two pieces of SRB slag debris were seen immediately prior to SRB separation.
Numerous pieces of slag debris were noted during and after SRB separation on
imagery from the long range tracking cameras.
MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORM (MLP) EVENTS
The SSME Mach diamonds formed in the expected sequence as seen on Camera
El9 and recorded in Table 2.3 (A). No follow-up action was requested. The
times of the Mach diamond formation are provided in Table 2.3.
SSME #3
SSME #2
SSME #1
02:34:15.728 UTC
02:34:15.872 UTC
02:34:15.937 UTC
Table 2.3 (A) Mach Diamond Formation
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Figure 2.3 (A) Orange Vapor during SSME Ignition
Orange vapor, probably free burning hydrogen, was seen above the SSME rims
and near the base heat shield during SSME ignition (Cameras E2, E5, El7, El8,
El9, E20, E36, E52, E63, E76, OTV070). Similar orange vapors have been seen
on several previous missions.
A small area of possible base heat shield erosion was noted at the base of SSME
#3 during SSME ignition. A similar area of tile erosion was also visible on the
outboard edge of the right RCS stinger. (Camera El9)
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Figure 2.3 (B) Bolt Hang-up on RSRB HDP M-3
A bolt hang-up was seen at RSRB holddown post M-3 at liftoff (02:34:19.579
UTC) (Camera El0). No debris fragments were seen near the DCS during the
hang-up and bolt release. SRB holddown bolt hang-ups have been seen on seven
of the last fifteen previous missions. See Table 2.3 (B). No follow-up action
was requested.
MISSION
STS-34
LOCATION OF HANG-UP
RSRB holddown
STS-33 RSRB holddown
STS-39 RSRB holddown
STS-43
STS-45
STS-50
STS-46
STS-53
STS-73
post M-2
post M-3
post M- 1
LSRB holddown post M-7
RSRB holddown post M-4
RSRB holddown post M-4
LSRB holddown post M-7
RSRB holddown post M-1
RSRB holddown post M-2
STS-75 LSRB holddown
STS-76 LSRB
STS-78 LSRB
RSRBSTS-79
STS-83 LSRB
STS-86 RSRB
post M-5
holddown post M-5
holddown post M-5
holddown post M-3
holddown post M-7
holddown post M-3
Table 2.3 (B) Table of Holddown Post Bolt Hang-ups
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2.4 ASCENT EVENTS
2.4.1 Flares in SSME Exhaust Plume
Figure 2.4.1 Orange-colored Flare in the SSME Exhaust Plume
Eleven orange-colored flares (probably debris-induced) were seen in the SSME
exhaust plume between 02:34:47.3 and 02:35:03 UTC (Cameras E207, ET212,
E222, E223).
Linear optical effects were seen along the launch vehicle at 02:36:02.869 and at
02:36:22.025 UTC (Cameras ET207 and E207).
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2.4.2 Body Flap Motion Analysis (Task #6)
STS-86
Figure 2.4.2 (A) Body Flap Motion during Ascent
Orbiter body flap motion was seen on STS-86 during ascent on the long range
tracking camera views. The apparent torsion or twisting motion of the Orbiter
body flap was reviewed with engineers from the ES/Structure and Dynamics
Branch on October 1, 1997. At this review, IS&AG was tasked to make
quantitative measurements of the motion to support a possible post landing
modal test of the body flap at KSC.
Measurements of the body flap motion were made on the launch tracking camera
imagery. Film E207 was screened to determine the sequence of frames for
analysis. Frames 2300 through 2700 were analyzed in the study (from 34.8-41.3
seconds MET). To verify that errors were not introduced in the data collection
process, measurements of the body flap motion were made using two
independent methods. The first method was manual using a duplicate master
film and a film motion analyzer. The second method was automated using a
video conversion of the E207 film and a recently-developed point tracking
program. The raw data sets for each technique were examined. The data from
the automatic procedure had a higher signal-to-noise ratio and, therefore, was
used for the remainder of the analysis.
Measurements of the body flap tip locations (Figure 2.4 (B), points 1 and 2) in
each frame were made using both the manual and the automatic procedure.
Reference/scale points (Figure 2.4 (B), points 3 through 8) were also measured
for all analysis frames using both procedures. The reference points were used to
remove the overall launch vehicle motion from the body flap motion and to
remove camera tracking motion. The reference points were also used to define
the scale factor. A noise reduction algorithm was applied to enhance the
dominant frequencies of the automatic data. The frequency analysis results are
shown in Figure 2.4 (C).
Measurements of the body flap motion showed an average peak-to-peak
deflection of the starboard body flap tip to be approximately of 1.4 inches. The
average peak-to-peak deflection of the port body flap tip was measured to be 1.5
JSC Summary Report A 14
.._s"
2.0 Summary of Significant Events
inches. The maximum peak-to-peak deflection measured approximately 4 inches
on both the port and starboard tips of the body flap. Both the port and starboard
data revealed frequency peaks at 8 Hz (global rotation) and 13 Hz (torsion
rotation).
Port "tip of Body Flap_th Respectto Point 8
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Figure 2.4.2 (B) Frequency Plot of STS-86 Body Flap Motion (Port Tip)
Measurements of the body flap motion were also made on STS-84 imagery using
identical procedures for comparison to the STS-86 data. The body flap motion
seen on STS-84 was similar to STS-86 in frequency except that the 13 Hz
frequency peak seen on STS-86 was not evident on STS-84 (torsion rotation).
Both the port and starboard data revealed frequency peaks at 8 Hertz (global).
On STS-84, an average peak-to-peak deflection of both the port and starboard
body flap tips was measured to be approximately 1.9 inches. The maximum
peak-to-peak deflection measured approximately 6 to 8 inches on the starboard
tip of the body flap and 8 inches on the port side. Table 2.4 is a summary of the
body flap motion image measurements from STS-84 and STS-86.
Low frequency, low amplitude peaks of 1 through 7 Hz are present in both the
STS-84 and STS-86 motion data, but are not attributed to independent body flap
motion. These lower frequency motions are variable, depending on the reference
points, and are not considered dominant frequencies. They may be attributed to a
combination of noise, vehicle vibration, atmospheric effects, and/or point
measurement variations.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events
Body flap maximum displacement (inches):
Starboard tip
Port tip
STS-84
6-8
STS-86
Body flap average displacement (inches):
Starboard tip
Port tip 1.9 I 1.45
Frequency:
Global Frequency
Torsional Frequency [ 8 I 8Not dominant 13
Table 2.4.2 Comparison of STS-84 and STS-86 Body Flap Motion Measurements
2.5
The point tracking error for the automatic procedure was calculated to be +/- 0.01
inches. The standard deviation after smoothing the data showed that the
maximum displacement error of the body flap was +/- 1.0 inches. The frequency
uncertainty calculated from the full half width of the dominant frequency peaks
was +/- 0.6 Hz for 8 Hz and +/- 0.4 Hz for 13 Hz.
A more detailed description of the STS-86 body flap motion imagery analysis is
available under separate documentation.
ONBOARD PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE EXTERNAL TANK
2.5.1 Analysis of the Umbilical Well Camera Films (Task #2)
Two rolls of umbilical well camera films from mission STS-86 were received:
the 16mm film (5mm lens) and the 16mm film (10mm lens) from the LH2
umbilical. The 35mm film from the LO2 umbilical well camera was unusable
due to darkness and was not printed. The +X translation maneuver was not
performed.
The LSRB separation appeared normal. Numerous light-colored pieces of debris
(insulation and frozen hydrogen), and dark debris (probably charred insulation)
were seen throughout the 16mm SRB separation film sequence. One large piece
of debris was noted near the base of the LSRB electric cable tray after SRB
separation. Both white and charred-appearing debris (probably insta-foam) were
seen near the LSRB attach point after SRB separation. Two pieces of white
debris (probably TPS) appeared to strike the left aft LSRB attach brace (no
damage was visible). Late in the LSRB separation film sequence, a large, piece
of debris (probably insta-foam) was seen falling aft. Chipping of the ET aft
dome TPS was visible. Typical ablation and charring of the ET/Orbiter LH2
umbilical electric cable tray and the aft surface of the horizontal section of the -Y
ET/SRB vertical strut was seen.
As in the case of the 35mm umbilical well camera film, the post-separation ET
was not imaged on the 16mm films. The ET separation film sequence of both of
the 16mm films were dark and unusable due to the nighttime conditions.
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2.6
2.5.2 Analysis of Handheld Photography of the ET (Task #3)
Post-separation handheld photography (method 4) of the STS-86 ET was
acquired. A Nikon 35mm camera with a 400mm lens was used for the ET
photography. In accordance with a decision made prior to flight, the 2X extender
was not used. The OMS-2 attitude pitch maneuver was performed to assist the
crew members in acquiring the ET visually.
Thirty-six views of the external tank were acquired (roll 328). Views of the
sides, nose and aft dome of the ET were acquired. Timing data is present on the
handheld film. The first ET picture was taken on September 26, 1997 at
03:19:53 UTC (approximately 45.5 minutes after liftoff), and the last picture was
taken at 03:25:57 UTC.
The size of the ET is very small on the film (0.22 mm), which hindered the visual
analysis of the ET condition. No anomalies were seen on the handheld
photography of the ET. The normal SRB separation burn scars and aero-heating
marks were noted on the ET TPS.
The ET was measured to be approximately 14.1 kilometers from the Orbiter on
the first usable image of the ET. The separation velocity was not calculated due
to the small size of the ET image. The tank tumble rate was determined to be
approximately 4.7 degrees/second. The ET roll rate was not determined.
In addition to the handheld photography, approximately 20 seconds of video of
the ET was acquired with a Canon L1 camcorder. The quality of the video was
excellent. The same aspects of the ET imaged on the still views were imaged on
the video. Like the film, the size of the ET image was very small on the video.
LANDING EVENTS
2.6.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #1)
Film camera EL7 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the Orbiter main
gear and camera film EL4 was used to determine the nose gear sink rate. The
sink rates of the Orbiter were determined over a one-second time period prior to
main and nose gear touchdown.
The measured main gear sink rate values were found to be below the maximum
allowable values of 9.6 ft/sec for a 211,000 lb. vehicle and 6.0 ft/sec for a
240,000 lb. vehicle (the landing weight of the STS-86 Orbiter was reported to be
214,726 lbs). The sink rate measurements for STS-86 are given in Table 2.6.1.
In Figure 2.6.1 (A), and 2.6.1 (B), the trend of the measured data points for the
image data is illustrated.
Sink Rate Prior to Touchdown (1 Second)
Main Gear 3.0 ft/sec.
Nose Gear 4.5 ft/sec.
Table 2.6.1 Sink Rate Measurements
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STS-86 Main Gear Landing Sink Rate
(Camera EL-7)
5
_'_ 4 3.0 ft/s
2.9 ft/s
2 _ 2 4 ft/s
z-_" 1 ....
-1
- 1 -0.9 -0.8-0.7 -0.6-0.5-0.4 -0.3-0.2 -0.1 0
Time relative to main gear touchdown (seconds)
height trend 1.0s ...... trend 0.5s _" - "trend 0.25s
Figure 2.6.1 (A) Main Gear Height versus Time Prior to Touchdown
STS-86 Nose Gear Landing Sink Rate
(Camera EL-4)
7.0
_. 6.0 4.5 ft/s
4.0
.,_u.
_'-_ 3.0 ' _J_.,,._ _ 3.4 ft/s
1.0
0.0'
- 1 -0.9-0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5-0.4-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0
Time relative to nose gear touchdown (seconds)
height trend 1.0s ...... trend 0.5s _ - "trend 0.25s
Figure 2.6.1 (B) Nose Gear Height versus Time Prior to Touchdown
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2.7
2.6.2 Drag Chute Analysis (Task #7)
JSC Structures and Mechanics Division/ES engineers requested photographic
measurements of the drag chute angles after deployment to support the
evaluation of the crosswind landing performance Detailed Test Objective
(DTO-805). This task is in work and the results will be reported under separate
documentation.
OTHER
2.7.1 Normal Events
Other normal events observed included: ice and vapor from the ET/Orbiter
umbilical areas during SSME ignition, elevon motion at SSME ignition, RCS
paper debris prior to liftoff, ET twang, multiple pieces of light-colored debris
falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0 umbilicals at disconnect, acoustic waves
after liftoff, debris in the exhaust cloud after liftoff, vapor off the SRB stiffener
rings, roll maneuver, contrails from the Orbiter wing tips, condensation around
the Shuttle Launch Vehicle, ET aft dome outgassing and charring of the ET aft
dome, linear optical effects, recirculation, SRB brightening prior to SRB
separation, SRB separation, and slag debris during and after SRB separation.
2.7.2 Normal Pad Events
Normal Pad events observed were: Hydrogen ignitor operation, FSS deluge
water operation, MLP deluge water activation, sound suppression system water
operation, TSM T-O umbilical operations and GH2 vent arm retraction.
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APPENDIX B. MSFC PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS SUMMARY
"..__.4
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
Marshall Space Flight Center, AL 35812
qeorv to Atto of: EP11 (97-026)
TO: Distribution
FROM: EP42/Thomas J. Rieckhoff
SUBJECT: Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for STS-86
The launch of Space Shuttle Mission STS-86, the 20 th flight of the Orbiter Atlantis,
occurred on September 25, 1997, at approximately 9:34 p.m., Central Daylight Time
(CDT) from Launch Complex 39A (LC-39A), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida.
Launch time was reported as 97:269:02:34:19.000 Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) by
the MSFC Flight Evaluation Team. Photographic and video coverage has be evaluated to
determine proper operation of the flight hardware.
The tracking coverage of the vehicle was degraded due to cloud coverage and moisture
content in the atmosphere. All ground-based cameras operated properly except for Items
E1 and E57, which failed to run; Item E212 which provided a short track of the vehicle
during ascent. The umbilical well cameras that record the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) and
External Tank (ET) separation events only provided data during the SRB separation due
to insufficient lighting at ET separation. The astronauts photographed the ET
approximately 37 minutes after separation using the hand-held 35ram Nikon camera with
a 400mm lens. The image size was too small for any detail analysis.
Holddown post M3 experienced a stud hangup at liftoff. A debris particle was observed
exiting the post when the stud cleared the hold.
The typical events such as pad debris from the SRB blast holes at ignition, RCS cover
paper and purge barrier material falling aft during ascent, debris-induced streaks in the
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) plumes, and glowing debris particles from the Solid
Rocket Motor (SRM) plumes were observed. An apparent nozzle cold wall leak was
visible at the beginning of SSME Number 1 start. The leak appeared to originate near the
Number 1 coolant line interface to the manifold. However, a post-flight leak check
indicated no cold wall leak in this area. Orbiter body flap motion during ascent was
pronounced as viewed from camera E207.
B1
Thefollowing eventtimeswereacquired.
EVENT
M-1 PIC Firing
M-2 PIC Firing
M-5 PIC Firing
M-6 PIC Firing
SRB Separation
TIME (UTC)
02:34:19.007
02:34:19.008
02:34:19.009
02:34:19.008
02:36:22.02
DATA SOURCE
CameraE9
CameraE8
CameraE12
Camera E 13
CameraE205
This report and additional information are available on the World Wide Web at URL:
http:/Iphoto4.msfe.nasa.govlSTSlsts861sts86.htmi
For further information concerning this report, call Tom Rieckhoff. NASA/MSFC, at
(205) 544-7677 or JeffHixson, Boeing North American, at (205) 971-3082.
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